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Abstract
In this paper we study the premiums between the prices of a stock traded both “spot”—ie with rolling
(t + 3) settlement—and “forward” (settlement at the end of the half-month), as was the practice in
Brussels until 1997. We first test for settlement effects, ie pure time-value explanations, and find that
these are theoretically small and empirically almost undetectable, despite the potentially high power
of our tests. Experimenting six arbitrage trading rules to seek for an explanation of what else might
behind the price differences, we find a clue in the autocorrelation of the premiums: positive premiums
tent to persist while negative ones do not. The persistence is too weak to allow profitable low-risk ‘arb’
trading, but the pattern still suggests that there is a ‘cash is king’ effect: sellers tend to prefer spot
sales, and buyers tend to go for forward purchases. This is consistent with the idea that the cost of
financing consists of not just pure time value but also of a fixed shadow cost (reflecting the hassle and
delays caused by raising cash), and that this cost is larger and arises more often and more persistently
than the hassle costs of shorting stocks.
JEL G14, G15
Key words: dual markets, price discovery, settlement effect, microstructure
Time Value in Spot and Forward Prices
on the Brussels Stock Exchange
Introduction
Until 1997, the most active of the Brussels-listed stocks were traded both “spot”—ie with
rolling (t + 3) settlement—and “forward” (settlement at the end of the half-month). Both
segments were order-driven, and their opening prices were set via a call. So there were no firm
bids and asks, implying that the usual no-arbitrage predictions about price differences should be
weakened into statements about expectations. In studying the premiums between the forward
and spot prices we first test for settlement effects, ie pure time-value explanations. Our finding
however is that these are theoretically small and empirically almost undetectable, despite the
potentially high power of our tests. Seeking for an explanation of what else might behind the
price differences, we find a clue in the autocorrelation of the premiums: positive premiums
tend to persist while negative ones do not; in fact, surprisingly often, negative premiums are
followed by positive ones. The persistence is too weak to allow profitable low-risk ‘arb’ trading,
but the pattern still suggests that, within these no-arb bounds, there is a ‘cash is king’ effect
at work: sellers tend to prefer spot sales, and buyers tend to go for forward purchases. This
is consistent with the idea that the cost of financing consists of not just pure time value but
also of a fixed shadow cost (reflecting the hassle and delays caused by raising cash), and that
this cost is larger and arises more often and more persistently than the inconvenience costs of
shorting stocks.
In the remainder of this introduction we briefly review the literature on settlement effects;
we explain how Brussels data could be useful here; and we specify the research questions and
the results.
A large numbers of empirical studies have been devoted to examine the settlement effect in
stock markets. These papers investigate either a day-of-the-week effect in the fixed-settlement-
lag procedure as in the US, Japan, Canada, Australia, or a day-of-the-settlement-period effect
in the fixed-settlement-date procedure as in the U.K., France, Italy, Switzerland, and Belgium.
A Note on Time Value in Spot and Forward Prices on the BSE 2
While the day-of-the-week effect is “too small to be detectable”,1 the findings for the fixed-
settlement-date procedure are mixed.2 All of these studies are hampered by a power issue when
testing the time-value effect in stock returns. In markets with a fixed-lag delivery system, the
variation of the time-value is very low because it stems from the two extra days of interest due
to the weekend. In the fixed-date markets, the time-value has higher variability as there is a
substantial change in time to maturity between the last price of a settlement period and the
next day’s price. If we can find stocks that are simultaneously traded on both systems, an even
more powerful test would be possible: investigate the time-value effect in price discrepancies
using the cross market data. As we show, this offers both a higher variation in the time value
and a regression error with lower variance. The Brussels Stock Exchange (BSE) was one of
the few markets that had both spot (fixed-lag) and forward (fixed-date) trading tiers, which
allows us to investigate the time-value effect more efficiently.3
A companion paper addresses the issue as to which market was noisier, that is, which acted
as the price discoverer, during the period 1989-1996. In this paper we study the behavior of
the spot-forward price differences or the forward premiums as they emerged, ex-post, from the
opening call. There are two issues of interest. First, we would expect a statistically clear time-
value or settlement effect in the forward premiums, stronger and statistically more detectable
than the settlement effects one expects in either spot or forward returns. The second issue is
whether the forward premiums are consistent with the notion of market efficiency. If prices
are unpredictable, then so should be price differences across markets; and any observed pre-
dictibilities should still be bounded by ‘arb’ transaction costs and have an acceptable economic
rationale.
Our results on settlement effects are mixed, at best. In the spot market we actually see
very little evidence in favor or against a time-value effect, consistent with our priors on the
power of the tests. In the forward markets, where the time value signals should be stronger,
we do find that time value affects prices, but the effect is substantially smaller than what
theory predicts. As expected, time value is noticeable in forward premiums, but even there
1Solnik(1990)
2Solnik (1990), and Crouhy, Galai and Keita (1991) document such an effect for the French market. Solnik
(1990) finds that the stock market index behaves as predicted, but on the individual-stock level Crouhy, Galai
and Keita (1991) find evidence of overreaction, especially for thinly traded securities. Jaffe and Westerfield
(1985) and Condoyanni, O’Hanlon and Ward (1987) report anomalous results for the London market.
3In Paris, in some periods, stocks were traded with either fixed or rolling settlement, never both. Basel had
parallel markets.
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the estimates remain below our theoretical priors.
Next, we move to the (un)predictability of forward premiums. We find that forward premi-
ums are anomalously autocorrelated. This then raises the question why traders do not react to
these predictable price anomalies. We then experiment with six arbitrage trading rules to test
whether it is possible to exploit this result, that is, whether we would make money if, whenever
the forward is too high relative to the spot price, we place market orders for a spot purchase
and a forward sale at the next opening, and vv. We find that the predictability is too weak
- relative to costs - to generate attractive ‘arb’ opportunities. More revealingly, there is an
asymmetry: the abnormal forward premiums that tend to peter out slowly are the unusually
positive ones, while abnormally negative ones on average almost vanish overnight. In addition,
large positive forward premiums are over two times more frequent and larger than negative
discrepancies. This pattern is the opposite of what one would expect if the problem had been
a lack of shortselling in the spot market. Instead, the anomaly suggests problems with raising
liquidities, steering buyers towards the forward market and sellers to the cash market, thus
creating episodes of persistently high forward premiums.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the markets and the data.
In Section 2 we start from a standard noisy-price model and derive, discuss, and perform alter-
native tests for settlement effects in, respectively, spot returns, forward returns, and forward
premiums. Section 3 provides the tests for autocorrelation. The pattern that emerges suggests
that the price discrepancies are not related to difficulties in going short but rather to simple
financing considerations. Section 4 concludes.
1 The Two-Tier Brussels Stock Exchange: Institutional Back-
ground
Brussels used to have not only its own stock market (the Brussels Stock Exchange (BSE),
integrated into Euronext since 2001), but even a two-tiered one: a “spot” market tier with
third-day delivery, and for the most active stocks a parallel “forward” tier with fixed-date
delivery. There used to be twenty-four fixed settlement dates per year, implying that the trad-
ing periods typically lasted about two weeks, hence their name quinzaine, two-week period.4
4The forward market has now disappeared, following a “T ≤ t + 7 days” rule implemented internationally
in the 1990s. London used to have a two-weekly fixed-delivery system too: Paris had delivery at the end of the
month in its “forward” section for big stocks. (There also was a spot section for small stocks). Basel offered the
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Details about the market organization are crucial for our analysis. In this section, we describe
the price mechanisms in the forward and spot market and the delivery rules as they applied
during the sample period.
1.1 The price mechanism in the forward tier
The forward market used to work via a pure public limit order book (which, during the sample
period, was kept by a version of Toronto’s Computer-Aided Trading System, CATS). Thus,
although brokers were allowed to trade on their own account, they did not act as market
makers, and their main role on the floor was to pass on the orders from the public to the
exchange. At 9 p.m., the one-hour pre-market started, during which orders could be added
or withdrawn and CATS displayed a continuously updated preliminary market-clearing price.
Actual trading in the forward market started at 10 a.m., with a simultaneous call market for
all stocks. That is, at 10 a.m. limit orders were matched as far as possible, and executed.
For most stocks the opening represented a substantial part of the day’s turnover. After the
opening round, the interactive trading session or “continuous market” started (10:00-16:30).
Throughout the continuous-market session, the four best unfilled limit orders on the buying
and selling side were displayed on computer screens and could be taken up by any incoming new
order. Only brokers saw the screens: at the time of the sample, individual investors just heard
(or saw) the opening and close prices over the radio or on Teletext, at noon or in the afternoon.
Orders could also be matched directly, between brokers or in-house, provided that the price
was within the book’s bid-ask spread and the trade was reported immediately to the exchange.
Large trades, i.e. blocks of at least BEF 50m (EUR 1,250,000) could be crossed or traded
outside the BSE (often in London or Paris), but had also to be reported immediately. There
were no limits on consecutive forward price changes. Limit order and trade prices were rounded
according to a schedule shown in Table 1. Until the 1996 reform, the exchange’s minimum
margin requirement for a forward trade was 25 percent, but the BSE left the enforcement of
this rule to the individual brokers (who bore the default risk). Securities could be posted as
margin; in fact, many investors left most or all of their stocks with a their broker—most shares
are bearer securities—and used this portfolio as margin for forward positions. Thus, there was
no opportunity cost associated with the margin.
Prices for all traded lots were shown, in sequence (but not time-stamped), in the official
choice between several delivery dates.
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Table 1: Tick Size in the Spot and Forward Market
price must be minimal percentage price change
a multiple of at lower end at top end
price range of scale of scale
BEF 1-500 1 100% 0.20%
BEF 502-1,500 2 0.40% 0.13%
BEF 1,505-5,000 5 0.33% 0.10%
BEF 5,010-10,000 10 0.20% 0.10%
BEF 10,025-50,000 25 0.25% 0.05%
BEF 50,050 50 0.10% —
Key One BEF is approximately EUR 0.025.
price list, a function later taken over by the financial dailies, De Tijd and L’Echo de la Bourse.
In the electronic records, only open/close/high/low are available.
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1.2 The Spot Price Mechanism
Due to its lower volume, the spot market was fully computerized much later (in 1996). Like
the forward tier, it was order-driven but the implementation was more artisanal. First, there
was no pre-market, so that the opening price was potentially much more subject to noise than
the forward opening price even apart from volume effects. Second, because of the thinness of
the market, for many stocks there was just one trading round per day; this subsegment of the
spot market was called the ‘parket/parquet ’ market. A continuous market existed only for the
more active stocks (quoted on the “corbeille” subsegment) and even this continuous market
was not very active.5 Third, there was no centralized public order book kept by the exchange.
Rather, a few specialist brokers each kept their own books, and met sometime between 1 p.m.
and 1.30 p.m. on the Exchange’s floor to aggregate their information and identify the price
that maximizes trade from the combined order book. Fourth, for stocks that were not traded
on the parallel forward market, there were daily price limits of 5 percent (for very thinly traded
stocks, traded on the parket segment) or 10 percent (for other stocks, traded on the “corbeille”
market). And, in the corbeille market, subsequent intraday price changes could not exceed 5
percent.
The actual pricing and trading was organized by a BSE official who started by crying out
a price proposal. This price proposal equaled the price that maximized trade from the order
book if that price was within the price change limits. If not, the official announced the price
limit itself. In addition to the price proposal, the official also announced the direction of the
imbalance. If there was an excess supply (demand) at the proposed price, additional purchase
(sale) orders from the floor were solicited to reduce the imbalance in the book. If the remaining
imbalance between supply and demand at the price limit was less than 50 percent, the specialist
would decide to ‘reduce’ most or all orders on the excess side, i.e. execute only part of each
order. The transaction price was then published in the financial press with the qualification
“sellers reduced” or “buyers reduced”. If, at the price limit, the imbalance between supply
and demand remained huge, even after soliciting orders from the floor, there was no trade at
all and the price limit was published as an indicative price. In practice, however, when the
imbalance was only slightly larger than 50 percent, the stock’s specialist brokers often added
purchase or sale orders for their own account to prevent no-trade (and no-income) days.
5Corbeille, meaning ‘basket’, refers to the tables with an unusual basket-like basis that were in that part of
the floor. Parquet refers to the wooden floor covering.
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As, around 1990, the spot market list contained about 300 stocks, the stock-by-stock
opening-call prices were set more or less sequentially. The exact timing of each stock’s spot
fixing was not registered.
As mentioned, the spot market had two sub-tiers. For about half the stocks, those listed
on the parket market with its less liquid stocks, the call was also the only price for that day.
For stocks quoted on the corbeille, the fixing was followed by the traditional (blackboard-and-
chalk) version of the continuous market: unfilled orders were chalked onto the blackboard and
could be picked up from the floor, and orders could also be matched directly on the floor at a
price within the book’s spread. For the corbeille market, prices for all traded lots were shown,
in sequence (but not time-stamped), in the official price list but in the electronic records, only
open/close/high/low are available. For the parket stocks there is just the single price.
1.3 Settlement Rules
For the BSE, the other details of the actual settlement were similar for both market tiers. The
buyer paid via a bank transfer rather than by check. This means that there was no “mail
float” on the payment side. Still, the value dates for buyer and seller did not match perfectly:
the buyer’s value date is one day before the actual settlement day and the seller obtains value
one day after settlement.
Delivery of the stock could mean actual physical delivery of the piece of paper, if the
buyer desired so. Alternatively, the buyer could ask that his or her purchase be recorded
with a netting and depository institution, the Caisse Interprofessionelle/Interprofessionele
Kas (CIK). The CIK merely netted the physical deliveries across brokers if actual delivery is
asked and held the paper on behalf of investors who did not demand physical delivery. Thus,
the CIK was not a clearing house in the usual sense: it did not act as a central counterpart, nor
did it cancel an individual investor’s earlier purchases against subsequent sales (or vice versa)
within one settlement period. There was some informal clearing by brokers, though: brokers
did not exact delivery and payment for a forward transaction that was reversed later on via
the same brokerage house and within the same quinzaine.
One function of the forward market, therefore, was to reduce the cost and hassle of mutually
offsetting stock deliveries and payments for trades that had been closed out within the same
quinzaine. This partly explains why, unlike in currency markets, the transaction costs for small
trades in the forward tier were somewhat lower than in the spot tier (as illustrated in Table
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Table 2: Transaction costs, spot and forward, 1990
cost of cost of
item spot trades forward trades
+) BSE Commission max(tradesize×0.03%, BEF 6 000)†
+) Transaction Tax max(tradesize×0.17%, BEF 10 000)
+) Brokerage fees:
- fixed part BEF 200∗
- variable part:
order BEF 1-5m 1% .8%
order BEF 5m-10m .8% .6%
order BEF 10m-20m .4% .3%
order BEF 20m-30m ≥ BEF 130 000‡ .2%
order ≥ BEF 30m ≥ BEF 130 000‡ ≥ BEF 120 000‡
† : 40 BEF is worth approx. 1 EUR; * : plus BEF 100 for the buyer if physical delivery is asked; ‡ : negotiable,
with the stated amounts as minima. Thus, around 1990 a rather small trade of BEF 250,000 (approx. EUR 6.250)
would cost 1.29 percent spot, and 1.09 percent forward. For an order of BEF 30m (750,000 Euros), the cost
difference may be as small as 10,000/30,000,000 = .033 percent.
2).6 A second useful feature of the forward tier is that it allows one to take short positions
until the end of the quinzaine, positions that could then be rolled over fairly easily. In Belgium,
there was no formal legal framework for asset borrowing and spot short-selling until the 1991
Financial Market Reform Act, and even then the only organized facility was the opening by the
central bank of a lending facility for Government bonds, accessible to the prime brokers who
distribute and quote the bonds. For stocks, shorting in the cash market meant (and means)
finding one’s own asset lender; even nowadays, prime brokers might only be willing to help for
big orders in big stocks. In short, the forward market provided the sole organized opportunity
for short positions.7 A third function of the forward market was to provide the equivalent of
buying on margin: the actual payment was deferred until the end of the quinzaine (at which
moment the forward contract could be rolled over) and the buyer just posted the 25 percent
security. Since leveraged buying was possible in the forward market, no organized system of
buying on margin was set up in the spot market.
6Another reason for the lower transaction costs might have been the fact that the forward market had vastly
larger volumes than the spot market for the same stock, see below.
7There was even a centralized mechanism for asset lending in the forward market if, at the end of the quinzaine
one wanted to roll over a short position. The solution was to borrow a stock (for delivery under the maturing
contract), and to buy it back for the new forward date. Finding a lender happened in an organized session on
the day of the prolongations. The agents settles his gain or loss, the difference of the initially contracted price
and the settlement price at 1:30 p.m. on the last day of the quinzaine, and also pays the time value until the
next settlement day. In return he holds a new contract at the settlement price.
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1.4 Possible clientele and differential information aspects
It is fair to say that the organization of the forward markets was superior: it was fully com-
puterized, and therefore faster, already by the late 80s; had a pre-market that revealed the
market consensus and reduced the impact of accidental imbalances that would otherwise have
plagued the opening call; enjoyed lower costs and no price limits; and was much deeper. Figure
1 reports the eight-year mean of the volume ratio, forward to spot, for each stock. Note that
the 71 selected stocks are ranked from low to high ratio. We see ratios going from 2.5 to 250;
more fairly perhaps, when stocks are put into three relative-volume buckets, each of 24 stocks,
the average relative volume per bucket goes from about 10 to 50.
In addition (or, perhaps, as a result of the above), conventional wisdom within the financial
community held that there also was an clientele- and efficiency-related form of segmentation.8
Indeed, because of its shorting facilities and the absence of price limits, the forward market
had a somewhat more speculative reputation, to the extent that conservative firms (such as
the major banks) have long resisted a forward listing. Because of this speculative image, the
forward market was considered to be the market for the more professional agents, while less
sophisticated investors were said to prefer the spot market. Having no systematic and fast
access to news during working hours, these amateur traders allegedly reacted slower than the
professionals. In the terminology of Garbade and Silber (1983), this view hypothesizes that the
forward market was the price discoverer, while the spot market was just a (lagging) satellite
market. This hypothesis is the central issue of the dissertation.
We conclude the descriptive section with some information on the data.
1.5 Data Description
The sample period starts in early 1989, at which time the forward market was fully computer-
ized, and it ends in 1996. In 1997, the forward market disappeared. Euronext’s historic-data
CDs for that period include the opening spot price per day, and, for the forward market, the
daily opening, high and low, and close price. Data on dividends, bonus dividends, splits, and
rights issues9 were missing, and were hand-collected from Memento der Effecten, a trade pub-
8We are indebted to the late Prof. Van Essche for this suggestion.
9A subscription right is represented by a coupon designated for the purpose and it is traded separately the
moment the stock goes ex this coupon. The market values of these “scripts” are very noisy so we worked with
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Figure 1: Mean of Volume Ratio, Forward to Spot
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lication, and from De Tijd, which published the Dutch-language version of the Official Price
List. For the risk-free rate, we used the Euro-BEF 1 week middle rate from Datastream.
We discarded foreign stocks, about half of the list, since price discovery for these shares
probably happens abroad anyway. So we started from data on 119 Belgian stocks traded on
both the spot and forward tiers of the Brussels Stock Exchange during the period 1989-1996.
Some data cleaning was required: 16 stocks are excluded due to an insufficient number of
observations (too many missing data points), 31 stocks are connected to other shares due to
a change in the name or code after a stock split or merger. Thus, 72 stocks remain. All
unusually large forward premiums or large changes in the prices were double-checked with the
prices posted on the hard copies of De Tijd, including the next-day rectifications for typos. All
prices that are indicated ‘sellers reduced’, ‘buyers reduced’, or ‘indicative’, were considered to
be missing observations. Whenever there is a missing price, the two returns that are associated
with that price are missing too. That is, we never use cumulated returns straddling some
missing price.
As the risk-free rate we used the one-week call-money rate and the [calendar days]/360
time convention that then applied outside the interbank market for bef.
We mainly use the opening prices for our empirical analysis. We would have liked to work
the standard instrinsic value of a subscription right.
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Table 3: Trading Frequency and One-day Return Variance across Turnover Classes
sample Number of Returns Average Variance Median Variance
(by turnover) Spot Forward Spot Forward Spot Forward
All 95,668 87,957 3.26 3.43 2.23 1.91
Low turnover 27,605 21,772 4.55 5.17 2.77 2.11
Medium turnover 31,192 29,324 3.23 3.12 1.92 1.66
High turnover 36,871 36,861 1.99 2.00 1.61 1.88
Key: Each turnover class contains 24 stocks, and ranking is done on the basis of average daily turnover.
with the close prices too, but for unknown reasons, close prices are missing quite often. Eight
years of data means over 2000 trading days. The number of effectively available observations
is very variable, ranging from below 50% to 100%. There is a clear relation with the market
activity. As can be seen in Table 3, the firms in low-, medium-, and high-turnover groups
on average trade 55, 62, and 74 percent of the time, respectively, in the spot market. In the
forward market, the corresponding numbers are 43, 58, and 74 percent. Forward markets more
often have missing prices than spot markets despite their higher turnovers and the absence of
price limits. This probably reflects the interventions by the spot market’s specialists mentioned
in Section 1.2. There is also a strong negative relation between turnover and return variance,
prima facie, as also illustrated via Figure 2. Much of that, however, seems to be due to the
outliers: when we consider medians, the schedule is much flatter.
By way of caveat, note that the variances in the text table offer just a rough first picture. It
ignores, for instance, the fact that the spot market was active on more days than the forward
tier, and that days where the forward market did not manage to reach equilibrium may also
have been unusually illiquid and noisy days in the spot market.
An extensive Appendix contains more details about the sample, including the list of stocks,
and, per stock, the period of listing, numbers of potential and actual prices of all kind (incl
buyers/sellers reduced, indicative prices, etc.). This is provided for each market separately,
and then for the intersection, ie the sample where both markets have reliable prices.
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Figure 2: Variances of daily returns, spot v forward; opening prices, all days
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2 Verifying the Settlement Effect in Prices in Well Integrated
Markets
The fixed-lag and periodic settlement systems, as adopted by the spot and forward markets,
respectively, should each generate a specific type of seasonal in the observed stock returns.
In the fixed-date (‘forward’) markets, consecutive prices within one settlement period are
essentially forward quotes with decreasing times to maturity, as shown in Table 4 below. It
follows that, within a given settlement period, the percentage price change corresponds to an
(unobservable) spot return minus approximately the daily risk-free rate.10 That is, percentage
price changes within a given settlement period should tend to be below the general average
return. On the other hand, there is a substantial change in time to maturity between the
last price of a settlement period and the next day’s price. Therefore, the percentage change
that straddles two adjacent settlement periods should consist of a true spot return plus two
weeks’ (London) or one month’s (Paris) worth of time value, and tend to be above the general
average return. Solnik (1990), and Crouhy, Galai and Keita (1991) document such an effect
for the French market. Solnik finds that the stock market index behaves as predicted, but on
the individual-stock level Crouhy, Galai and Keita find evidence of overreaction, especially for
thinly traded securities. Jaffe and Westerfield (1985) and Condoyanni, O’Hanlon and Ward
10This claim is exact only if riskfree rates are constant across maturities and over time.
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Figure 3: Asynchronism of Spot vs Forward Prices
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(1987) report anomalous results for the London market.
Spurious seasonals caused by time-value effects should also be observed in markets with
a fixed-lag delivery system. As ‘days’ refer to working days rather than calendar days, any
intervening weekend or holiday should lead to time-value effects in prices. As Solnik (1990)
notes, there is often a day-of-the-week effect but its size is:
”... usually much larger than the expected effect of the settlement procedure, and often does
not take place on the expected day.11 This implies that the observed day-of-the-week effect
is explained by other phenomena and that the influence of the settlement procedure is too
small to be detectable without a precise model of these other phenomena.”
McFarland, Pettit, and Sung (1982) study foreign exchange markets (where, with a few
exceptions, a second-working-day rule applies). For the Vienna stock market, Gruenbichler
(1991) reports anomalous seasonals that substantially exceed the effects of time value.
We first turn to the tests of settlement effects. In Section 2.2 we will discuss the pros and
cons of tests that rely on time series of either spot returns or forward returns, relative to tests
on forward premiums. Section 2.3 introduces the way we obtain average coefficients. Results
follow in Section 2.4.
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2.1 The Model
Let vt denote an unobservable true value, based on full and correct use of all relevant available
information, expressed as a price for immediate payment and delivery. Since neither the actual
spot nor the forward prices imply immediate settlement, the corresponding true “spot” and
forward values, denoted as s and f , should contain a settlement effect shown below, with ns
and nf denoting the number of calendar days to settlement and R the simple per diem interest
rate. In addition, actually observed prices are assumed to deviate from true values by a zero-
mean, i.i.d. noise term, denoted by s or f , respectively, which reflects unanticipated orders
by liquidity traders and noise traders, as standard in microstructure models:12
noise-free prices: st+τ = (1 + ns,tRt)vt+τ , (1)
ft = (1 + nf,tRt)vt, (2)
observed prices: St+τ = st+τ (1 + s,t+τ ) = vt+τ (1 + ns,tRt)(1 + s,t+τ ), (3)
Ft = ft(1 + f,t) = vt(1 + nf,tRt)(1 + f,t). (4)
with Et−(s,t+τ ) = 0 = Et−(f,t); t− a short time before t; time t is 10 a.m., the opening of the
forward market; time t+ τ is 1 p.m, the opening time of the spot market.
These models are not ready for use as such since they contain unobservable prices. The
standard way to make such models tractable, in the sense of being able to identify some key
parameters, is to consider returns—percentage changes in S or F , as is done below. In (5)
and (7), the true values have been combined into a true return, denoted as ρt, which is then
assumed to be unpredictable white noise. We also introduce the shorthand notation ∆nsR and
∆nfR to indicate the settlement effect in a spot or forward returns, and e to indicate ln(1 + ).
Therefore, for the continuous spot market we have:
rs,t+τ := ln
(
St+τ
St+τ−1
)
,
= ln
(
1 + ns,tRt
1 + ns,t−1Rt−1
)
+ ln
(
vt+τ
vt+τ−1
)
+ ln(1 + s,t+τ )− ln(1 + s,t+τ−1), (5)
=: ∆(nsR)t + ρt+τ + es,t+τ − es,t+τ−1, (6)
11See e.g. Lakonishok and Levi (1982), Jaffe and Westerfield (1985).
12We ignore the time value of half a day as interest is calculated per entire day only.
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and likewise, in the forward tier,
rf,t := ln
(
Ft
Ft−1
)
,
= ln
(
1 + nf,tRt
1 + nf,t−1Rt−1
)
+ ln
(
vt
vt−1
)
+ ln(1 + f,t)− ln(1 + f,t−1), (7)
=: ∆(nfR)t + ρt + ef,t − ef,t−1. (8)
2.2 Competing Test Equations for Settlement Effects: pros & cons
We consider four test equations, each with its pros and cons. The first two are our earlier
expressions for the spot and forward returns, equations (6) and (8). The third test equation
is the difference of the returns which, because of the overlap in the afternoon, boils down to
the difference between the two morning returns (10 a.m.-1:30 p.m.). The fourth focuses on the
forward premium, ln(F/S), and is obtained by subtracting the two log-price equations, the
logs of (3) and (4):
rs,t+τ = ∆(nsR)t + ρt+τ + es,t+τ − es,t+τ−1, (9)
rf,t = ∆(nfR)t + ρt + ef,t − ef,t−1, (10)
rf,t − rs,t+τ = [∆(nfR)t −∆(nsR)t] + [ρt − ρt+τ ] + [ef,t − ef,t−1]− [es,t+τ − es,t+τ−1],
= [∆(nfR)t −∆(nsR)t] + [ρmt − ρmt+1] + [ef,t − ef,t−1]− [es,t+τ − es,t+τ−1],
(11)
pt := ln
(
Ft
St+τ
)
= ln
(
1 + nf,tRt
1 + ns,tRt
)
+ ln
(
vt
vt+τ
)
+ ef,t − es,t+τ ,
= ∆(nfsR)t − ρmt+1 + ef,t − es,t (12)
where r is the observed return (or percentage price change, including any coupon detached
between t−1 and t); ∆(nRt) is the theoretical settlement effect in the left-hand-side variable;13
ρt and ρt+τ are the one-day true returns and ρmt is the true return in the morning (10 a.m.-
1:30 p.m.); et is the percentage noise added in the time-t price. One can, therefore, regress
each of the left-hand-side variables on its associated theoretical time value and test for a unit
regression coefficient, treating both the true return and the micro-structural noise terms as a
13Specifically, for the spot returns ∆nsRt equals ln[(1 + ns,t−1Rt−1)/(1 + ns,tRt)] where ns,t is the number of
calendar days between date t and the settlement date, and Rt the per diem interest rate. For forward rates the
definition is analogous. For forward premiums, it equals ln[(1 + nf,tRt)/(1 + ns,tRt).
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Table 4: Variability of the Time to Settlement over a Representative Two-week
Trading Period, and actual sample sigmas
Representative two-week trading period: characteristics actual (∆)nx.R
Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri stdev mean stdev
ns 3 3 5 5 5 3 3 5 5 5
nf 16 15 14 13 12 9 8 7 6 5
∆n for rs −2 0 2 0 0 −2 0 2 0 0 1.33 0.000 0.027
∆n for rf 11 −1 −1 −1 −1 −3 −1 −1 −1 −1 3.92 -0.000 0.100
∆n for rf -rs 13 −1 −3 −1 −1 −1 −1 −3 −1 −1 4.64 -0.000 0.100
∆n for p 13 12 9 8 7 6 5 2 1 0 4.42 0.149 0.112
Key: The table refers to two normal trading weeks. Line one shows the number of calendar days to settlement
in the spot market: three in the beginning of the week, jumping to five as of Wednesday because a weekend
intervenes. Line 2 shows time-value days forward, relative to the settlement date which is on Wednesday in
week 3. Lines 3 and 4 show nt − nt−1, which is the sequence of time-value days in a series of spot and forward
returns, rs or rf . Lines 5 and 6 show the time value days in a series of return differences and in a series of
forward premiums p. The last column shows the standard deviation of the actual regressor, n.R, in percent
p.a., for a hypothetical stock that would have had no missing data.
regression error.14
One possible objection against the first and second test equation is that expected true
returns should be higher, on average, in periods with high risk-free rates, which would introduce
some correlation between noise and the regressor and, therefore, bias the slope coefficient
upward if 4nf > 0 and downward if 4nf < 0. We provide an upper bound on this effect in
the Appendix, where we conclude that the bias must be trivial.
A second issue is statistical power, with as its two prime determinants the variances of the
regressor and of the regression error term. Most of the variability in the regressor, a time-value
effect, stems from the ever-changing number of days to settlement. Table 4 shows how, over a
two-week period, the days to delivery evolve in each market (lines 1-2) and it shows what the
resulting time-to-settlement pattern is in spot and forward returns. Obviously, working with
spot returns provides far less power than with forward returns where, for about the same error
variance,15 the regressor has a standard deviation that is about three times higher. But either
method suffers from an extra source noise, as the regression error comprises not only the two
14Note, in passing, that because of the absence of market makers, every price is not a firm quote but a number
that is the stochastic outcome of an auction or call. The usual arbitrage one sees in currency markets is not
possible here because there are no firm quotes. The only type of arbitrage that can (and should) occur is when
market orders are placed. Then the choice of the market should be based on the expected prices to be produced
by the opening call.
15as far as we can judge from the preliminary tests.
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pricing errors but also the common one-day true return.
In the next test equation, i.e. the difference-of-return equation (11), the regressor has
an even better variability than the forward-return regression, as one can see in Table 4. If
prices had been synchronous, there would have been no true return in the regression either.
In reality, the timing difference means that there are two true morning return items in the
residual, and whether this is better than one full-day return is far from obvious. Moreover,
this difference-of-returns test involves four pricing errors instead of two besides the two true
return terms, and it has more missing observations: we lose any day where either a spot or a
forward price is missing, contemporaneous or lagged once. The last test equation (12) seems
to have it both ways: only a half-day true return shows up in the error term, and the regressor
has very good variability (see also Table 4). Consequently, the forward-premium test equation
dominates the difference-of-returns version in that it involves just two price error terms plus
one true morning return and it generates fewer missing data. In addition, times to maturity
are well spread all over the spectrum in the former equation. For the regressions based on rf or
rs, in contrast, there is a low-variability sample most of the time, interrupted by a big outlier
at the change of the quinzaine, which provides a very influential subsample of just about 192
observations, about 10 percent of the total. Yet using forward premiums instead of returns is
not the perfect solution either. Relative to the single-return-based regressions, the drawback
is that it uses cross-market information, postulating that time value is taken into account to
the same extent in the two markets. The spot- or forward-return-based tests obviously do not
need that. Since no equation clearly dominates on all counts, we report results for both returns
and forward premiums.
2.3 Aggregated Estimates
In testing for settlement effects (or for autocorrelation of forward premiums, for that matter)
we first consider individual estimates. But we also want to look at aggregate or average results.
For one, aggregate results provide summary measures on, for example, the settlement effect for
the entire forward-spot Brussels Stock Exchange (the macro level) or for meaningful subgroups,
like turnover-based portfolios.16 An additional motivation for macro inference is that individual
estimates are often noisy and imprecise. Therefore, the test results from aggregate data could
support or complement the individual tests. For example, if most individual estimates are
16Thanks to Pierre Hillion for this suggestion.
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significant, aggregate estimates are expected to be so too, but the aggregate can be significant
even when most individual estimates are not. In this sense, we investigate a kind of average
of the estimates.
One question that arises in this connection is the heterogeneity among the estimates of the
individual series. According to Pesaran and Smith (1995), there are four procedures that can be
used to estimate this average effect: the mean group estimator (estimating separate regressions
for each group and averaging the coefficients over groups), pooled regression, aggregate time-
series regressions, and cross-section regressions on group means. In the static case, where
the regressors are strictly exogenous and the coefficients differ randomly and are distributed
independently of the regressors across groups, all four procedures provide a consistent and
unbiased estimate of the coefficient means (Zellner, 1969). The aggregate time-series regression
procedure involves averaging data over groups into a portfolio. This procedure is not suitable
for our data because too many observations are lost during the aggregation. Since, in each of the
settlement-effect tests, the regressors are identical across stocks, the independence condition
is obviously met. So, a panel data procedure for estimating the average effects is justified
here. For time value estimation in our studies, the aggregation estimate in principle equals the
average of the individual ones, since individual regressions have the same regressor.
2.4 Empirical Results on Settlement Effect Tests
We report the empirical results of the single return series tests and then of the forward premi-
ums test in order to estimate whether the time value is correctly reflected in prices.
From Equations (9)-(12), the settlement effect is tested for by regressing the daily spot or
forward returns, or the daily forward premiums, on the corresponding time value:
E(rs,t+τ |∆(nsR)t) = αs + βs ·∆(nsR)t, (13)
E(rf,t|∆(nfR)t) = αf + βf ·∆(nfR)t, (14)
E(pt|∆(nfsR)t) = αp + βp ·∆(nfsR)t. (15)
We expect a slope of unity or, if there are tax effects (10% withholding tax), a number no
lower than 0.9.
The general picture is one of positive coefficients but, typically, less than half of the esti-
mates are above unity and the aggregate coefficients are below unity. There are some surprising
differences across data types, though.
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Figure 4: Time Value Coefficient Estimates and p-Values, Spot Returns
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key: Returns (spot) for 72 stocks are regressed on the theoretical time-value effect, ∆(nR)t, and we expect
a slope of unity or at least 0.90. The figures show the slope estimates (to the left) and their p-values (to the
right). The stocks are ranked by turnover. Stock 25, whose coefficient falls outside the graph, has an outlier
estimate of -66. Estimates per stock are plotted for stocks ranged by turnover rate. For visibility, the dots are
linked by line segments, but any similarity to a time-series plot is unintended.
Table 5: Time Value Effects in Returns and Forward Premiums: selected summary
statistics in single-series tests
# of coefficients > 1 in sample:
# of rejections of ...
All
Turnover classes:
regressee β = 0 β = 1 both neither Low Mid High
spot return 9 4 2 61 26 4 12 10
forward return 14 38 3 23 13 9 1 3
forward premium 25 36 7 18 14 9 2 3
key: Returns (spot or forward) and ex-post forward premiums for 72 stocks are regressed on the theoretical
time-value effect, ∆(nR)t, and we expect a slope of unity or at least 0.90. The table provides some summary
statistics on the 72 slope estimates in each regression.
2.4.1 Spot returns
We start by outlining the findings. At the individual level, the settlement-effect test suggests
that the time value is usually not correctly taken into account in the spot prices and the
estimation uncertainties are huge. At the macro level, i.e. the aggregate regression, the panel-
data estimates show that the time value seems to be correctly reflected in the spot prices in
the group of high-turnover stocks, but probably not in the mid-turnover group and definitely
not among the thinly-traded stocks. However, also because of low variation in the regressor,
the estimates are very imprecise in the total group and the three subgroups. Actually, even the
total absence of any attention to time-value factors is statistically acceptable for the groups of
low- and medium-turnover stocks.
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Table 6: Time Value Effects in Returns and Forward Premiums: Aggregates
sample single time-series βˆ panel estimation of βˆ Wald Test - Null: Slope=1
(by turnover) avge median n>1 βˆ SE(βˆ) t-stat prob F-stat d.o.f. prob
spot returns: E(rs+τ |(∆(nsR)t) = α+ β ·∆(nsR)t
All -0.72 0.67 26 0.44 0.67 0.66 0.5113 0.68 (1, 95589) 0.4093
Low turnover -1.06 -0.22 4 -0.68 0.74 -0.92 0.3584 5.16 (1, 27574) 0.0231
Medium -2.16 1.03 12 0.56 0.71 0.79 0.4275 0.38 (1, 31167) 0.5363
High 1.07 0.94 10 1.19 0.77 1.55 0.1223 0.06 (1, 36846) 0.8077
forward returns: E(rf |(∆(nfR)t) = α+ β ·∆(nfR)t
All 0.55 0.27 13 0.29 0.16 1.81 0.0702 19.64 (1, 87549) 0.0000
Low turnover 1.01 0.56 9 0.47 0.22 2.14 0.0320 6.05 (1, 21684) 0.0139
Medium 0.17 0.14 1 0.23 0.18 1.27 0.2042 18.81 (1, 29195) 0.0000
High 0.45 0.23 3 0.24 0.19 1.27 0.2034 16.94 (1, 36668) 0.0000
forward premiums: E(ln(F/S)t|(∆(nfsR)t) = α+ β ·∆(nfsR)t
All 0.44 0.29 14 0.41 0.09 4.74 0.0000 44.79 (1, 76670) 0.0000
Low turnover 0.85 0.66 9 0.56 0.16 3.54 0.0004 7.87 (1, 18009) 0.0050
Medium 0.15 0.36 2 0.43 0.10 4.16 0.0000 31.58 (1, 25829) 0.0000
High 0.33 0.21 3 0.33 0.10 3.19 0.0014 41.89 (1, 32830) 0.0000
Key: Returns (spot or forward) and ex-post forward premiums for 72 stocks are regressed on the theoretical
time-value effect, ∆(nR)t. We do this for the entire sample (72 stocks), and then for three subsamples (‘low’,
‘medium’, ‘high’) of stocks arranged by average daily turnover.
Here are the details that support the above claims. The results for the equation-by-equation
tests in the spot market are summarized in Figure 4 and in the leftmost and top panels of
Tables 5 and 6. Some of the news is quite good. Out of 72 coefficients, 26 exceed unity; in
the mid- and high-turnover samples the figures are even 12/24 and 10/24, and the medians
for these groups are very close to unity. But all this is overlaid by a pattern of very noisy
estimates that exhibit a big negative skewness. Stock 25, in the mid-turnover group, achieves
an incomprehensible estimate of –66, producing a sub-sample mean of –2.16 against a median of
1.03. Only for the high-turnover group, skewness does not seem to be a problem. Imprecision is
huge. No less than 61 stocks out of 72 accept both a zero and a unit value for the coefficient.17
Only nine reject a zero value, and four reject a unit value; of these, two reject both.
The imprecision problem is our prime motivation for adding aggregate estimates. With
regard to the macro inference, the panel data estimates in the middle columns in Table 6 show
that aggregates turn out to give less weight to the negative individual estimates, meaning that
these were deemed to be very noisy. The resulting estimates are, roughly speaking, between
17All significance statements in this paper are at the 5% level, one-sided.
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Figure 5: Time Value Coefficient Estimates and p-Values, Forward Returns
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Key: Returns (forward) for 72 stocks are regressed on the theoretical time-value effect, ∆(nR)t, and we expect
a slope of unity or at least 0.90. The figures show the slope estimates and their p-values. The stocks are ranked
by turnover. Estimates per stock are plotted for stocks ranged by turnover rate. For visibility, the dots are
linked by line segments but any similarity to a time-series plot is unintended.
the unweighted means and the medians. The time value coefficient is insignificantly positive in
the pooled sample of all 72 stocks and all three subsamples. Except for the the low-turnover
group, the coefficient estimate is, in addition, not significantly different from unity. As for the
other two groups, the time value has no statistically significant impact on returns and, for the
low-turnover stocks, its slope coefficient is definitely not equal to unity either. We conclude
that, generally, and with the notable exception of most active stocks, the time value effect was
not taken into account in the spot prices.
2.4.2 Forward Returns and Forward Premiums
The results for forward premiums and forward returns are similar. Also in these data the
general picture is one of coefficients that are positive but below unity, as we substantiate below.
An expected finding is that precision is up, especially for forward premiums. Unexpectedly,
however, relative to results from spot returns, medians and general averages are generally
lower except for low turnover stocks (which, admittedly, did very badly in the spot-return-
based tests). Medium turnovers and especially the active stocks do worse in this test than low
turnover stocks. Lastly, there is right-skewness rather than left-skewness. Let us consider the
evidence behind these claims.
Out of the total 72 stocks, the number of series that accept both a unit and a zero slope
value falls from 61 (rs) to 23 (rf ) and 18 (p). The number of stocks that reject both a zero and
a unit slope rises from 2 to 3 or 7. All this suggests better precision, as expected given the
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Figure 6: Time Value Coefficient Estimates and p-Values, Forward premiums
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Key: Realized forward premiums for 72 stocks are regressed on the theoretical time-value effect, ∆(nR)t, and
we expect a slope of unity or at least 0.90. The figures show the slope estimates and their p-values. The stocks
are ranked by turnover. Estimates per stock are plotted for stocks ranged by turnover rate. For visibility, the
dots are linked by line segments but any similarity to a time-series plot is unintended.
clearer signals.
More precision should mean more significantly non-zero results, everything else being the
same. The number of rejections of a zero slope rises from 9 to 14 (rf ) or even 25 (p). One
would expect these clearer signals also to be reflected in prices to a larger extent than the feeble
signals that are present in spot markets, i.e., also coefficients should rise. Yet this turns out to
be too optimistic. Most of the estimates are positive indeed, but the number of slopes above
unity has shrunk from 26 (spot returns) to 13 (forward returns) or 14 (premiums). Relatedly,
more stocks—38 or 36, up from 4—now reject a unit slope. Average and median slopes are
down in all samples except for the low-volume group. Curiously, in light of the spot-return
results and intuition, low-turnover stocks actually do best now: most above-unity slopes now
are low-turnover stocks (9/13 for rf , 9/14 for p instead of 4/26 for rs). This is also reflected in
the averages and medians of the single-series estimates: these look impressively close to unity
for low-turnover stocks and then fall if we go higher on the turnover scale.
As for the macro analysis, the panel data estimation in Table 6 shows that, except for the
mid- and high-turnover groups in the forward return test, time value is definitely a factor in all
the remaining six cases: each of the six coefficient estimates is significantly positive. Yet, they
now also all reject a unit slope statistically, and even the best numbers are further below unity
than what we saw in spot data. Third, again confirming the results from individual regressions
and contrasting with the findings from spot data, the highest aggregate coefficient is for the
low-turnover group, with the lowest for the medium- (rf ) or the high-turnover stocks (p).
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To sum up: in the spot market we actually see very little evidence in favor of or against a
time-value effect. In the forward markets, where the time value signals should be stronger, we
do find that the time value affects prices, but the effect remains substantially smaller than what
theory predicts. As expected, the estimate from the forward premiums provides the cleanest
results, but, even there, the estimates remain below our theoretical priors. In the next section,
we question the hypothesis of market efficiency under which the forward premiums should be
unpredictable.
3 Autocorrelation in the Price Discrepancies
Let us define the settlement-corrected forward price and premium as follows:
F ′t := Ft
1 + ns,tRt
1 + nf,tRt
, (16)
p′t := ln
F ′t
St+τ
, (17)
= −ρmt+1 + ef,t − es,t. (18)
As of now, the prime refers to the time-value-corrected version, p′.
In our proposed model for the efficient markets, we assume that the true return ρ and the
noises s are unpredictable. This hypothesis means that the the premium p′ should have zero
autocorrelation. We will now examine the autocorrelation of the forward premium.
3.1 Autocorrelations in Forward Premiums
Figure 7 summarizes the autocorrelation of the forward premium for the individual stock
estimates visually, while Table 7 provides some numerical information. The obvious feature
is that autocorrelation is positive. Out of the total 72 cases, only one estimate actually is
negative, and only marginally so, while 66 cases or 91.7% of the estimates are significantly
positive. The averages and the number of significant rejections tend to fall the more active the
stock is, but the effect is quite slight: the general average coefficient is 0.27, falling from 0.32
to 0.24 as we go from thinly to actively-traded stocks. The medians are similar.
For aggregates obtained via panel regression, we test the independence assumption by
regressing, for every equation, the 72 slopes on the corresponding turnovers. For the sample
as a whole there is, unsurprisingly, a significant negative relation, but within turnover groups
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Figure 7: Autocorrelation in the Forward Premiums, Stock by Stock.
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Key: ex-post forward premiums for 72 stocks are regressed on their lagged value. This slope, γ1, estimates
the scaled autocovariance of the forward premiums. A zero γ1 means that the forward premiums are not
correlated, a positive one signals positive autocorrelation in premiums, meaning that the true-morning-return
is also autocorrelated of first-order. We show estimated gammas and their p-values for all stocks, arranged by
daily average turnover. Estimates per stock are plotted for stocks ranged by turnover rate. For visibility, the
dots are linked by line segments but any similarity to a time-series plot is unintended.
Table 7: Test of Autocorrelation in the Forward Premiums.
Et−∆
(
F ′t−St
St−1
|St−1, F ′t−1
)
= γ0 + γ1
F ′t+1−St−1
St−1
sample individual series estimation panel estimation
(by turnover) mean median n>0 sgnf>0 sgnf<0 γˆ1 SE(.) t-stat prob
All 0.27 0.26 71 68 0 0.29 0.011 25.33 0.0000
Low turnover 0.32 0.32 24 23 0 0.32 0.022 14.30 0.0000
Medium 0.26 0.26 23 22 0 0.27 0.016 17.08 0.0000
High 0.24 0.20 24 23 0 0.26 0.012 21.50 0.0000
Key: ex-post forward premiums for 72 stocks are regressed on their lagged value. A zero γ means that the
forward premiums are not correlated, a positive one signals positive autocorrelation in premiums, meaning
positive autocorrelation in the true-morning return. We show summary statistics for all stocks and for three
subsamples of stocks arranged by daily average turnover.
there is no more clear link (Table 8). The aggregates are very similar to the straightforward
means of individual estimates, and are clearly different from zero. All this implies that the
forward premium is predictable, which is a sign of inefficiency—for example, a differentially
slow dissemination of the fundamental information for at least one day.18 This phenomenon
occurs across the entire spectrum of trading volume. So, the question is whether this is,
economically, an anomaly or not.
18Autocorrelation in the true morning returns could be a source of autocorrelation in price discrepancies, but
it is almost unthinkable, in an efficient market, that the true returns could generate daily autocorrelation of 0.3.
Also, we see no such high autocorrelation in either spot or forward returns.
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Table 8: Preparing for Panel Estimation: Independence Tests for Slopes
regressing γj on turnover
slope t-stat prob
All -1.80 -2.63 0.0104
Low turnover 2.96 0.10 0.9199
Medium 12.35 1.90 0.0707
High -0.37 -0.40 0.6943
Key: γ1 estimates the scaled autocovariance of forward premiums. To be able to estimate the mean gamma via
panel regressions with a common slope we need to test that individual stocks’ gammas are deviating randomly
from a general mean. Here we test whether there is a relation with turnover, first in the all-stock sample and
then in the three subsamples of stocks assembled on the basis of average daily turnover.
We first ask whether the predictability is so large as to allow profitable two-way arbitrage
(buying low, selling high), and find that it is not.19 We also find that the persistence may have
to do something with a cash-is-king effect: there is an inconvenience in finding cash (think of
the hassle, the delays), so buyers prefer to buy forward and sellers prefer to sell spot.
3.2 Trading Strategy
In the preceding section, we saw that the autocorrelation of the forward premium is significantly
positive, implying a partial predictability of next-day price discrepancies. In this section, we
will test whether it is possible to exploit this result, that is, whether we would make money if,
whenever the forward is too high relative to the spot price, we place market orders for a spot
purchase and a forward sale at the next opening, and vv. We will also test whether the payoff
from this ‘arb’ strategy is significantly higher/lower than that from similar trades where stocks
are selected randomly rather than on the basis of an earlier price imbalance.
We study six trading rules. The three ‘buy spot/sell forward’ rules are triggered by an
abnormal premium between 2 and 3%, between 3 and 4%, and above 4% respectively, while the
three ‘sell spot/buy forward’ rules react to abnormal premiums between –2 and –3%, between
–3 and –4%, and below –4% respectively. Below, we will describe in detail one strategy based
on the positive-2-percent event. The other five strategies are similar.
19For two-way arbitrageurs, as defined by Deardorff (1979), the discrepancy should exceed the two-way trans-
action cost. One-way arbitrageurs, in contrast, are liquidity traders or information traders who just choose in
which market they buy or sell. Such traders weigh the cross-market price discrepancy against the difference of
the transaction costs instead of their sum, so transaction costs play almost no role for one-way arbitrageurs.
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Every day, each of the 72 stocks is evaluated for eligibility to be traded on the next day.
Consider the trading strategy based on a +2-to-3% event. If the event occurs for a stock j on
day t, we expect that at the next opening its forward price will still be too high, relative to
the spot. So we immediately sell high/buy low: we place market orders for execution the next
day to sell stock j forward and buy it back spot. If the long position is funded by borrowing
money, this is a zero-investment strategy. The payoff is realized at the end of the quinzaine,
when the forward trade is settled and the loan for the stock trade paid back. Yet, note that
this payoff is fully known as soon as the spot market has opened.
Obviously, there are likely to be days with more than one such trade per day. So we want
to study the payoff for a portfolio with a daily varying number of positions. We consider
two versions. In the first and most straightforward one, the daily credit line is fixed at BEF
10 million, to be divided equally across the number of stocks selected, denoted as nt. The
payoff after transaction costs is computed using the transaction cost calculated from Table
2 for nt orders worth 10m/nt each. On each forward settlement date, we add up our total
proceeds across the stocks per day of trading and then across all trading days inside the
expiring settlement period. We report the number of positive outcomes as well as the number
of significantly positive and negative outcomes. To get these significance bounds we proceed
via a bootstrap described below.
The drawback of this fixed-portfolio-size rule is that the riskiness of the payoff varies sub-
stantially over time, in line with nt. In the alternative application, we abandon the fixed size
and go for an approximately constant risk instead. Specifically, the daily portfolio size is set
at BEF 10m×√nt. Again, this daily credit line is allocated equally across the nt stocks, which
makes each order size for each stock equal to BEF 10m/
√
(nt). The advantage is that the
problem of a changing standard deviation of the portfolio, following from day-to-day changes
in nt, is much reduced. In fact, if all trades were equally risky and mutually independent, the
portfolio variance would be constant:
for IID x˜j : var
 1√
n
n∑
j=1
x˜j
 = 1
n
n∑
j=1
var(x˜j) = var(x˜).
In a less heteroscedastic time series of net gains per quinzaine we expect our test to have
greater statistical power.
A trading strategy based on a negative event is similar, except of course that if a negative
event occurs for a given stock, we will sell that stock forward and buy spot on the next day, as
we expect that the negative premium should still be there to some extent. We also implement
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the trading rule with subgroups of stocks, for instance, considering only the 24 low-turnover
stocks rather than the full set of 72. The number of settlement periods for which there was at
least one trade varies, depending on the sample.
The risk of these strategies derives from two sources: there is three and a half hours of
‘true’ returns (from 10 a.m. and 1.30 p.m.), and there is microstructure noise. This matters
for two reasons. First, even under the null of no predictability, buying at 10 a.m. and selling
at 1:30 p.m. should still earn a positive expected return; thus, although it is of interest to
know how often this is profitable, the relevant null is not that the expected payoff is zero.
Absent a non-controversial model of normal returns, we therefore compare the payoff with the
distribution of bootstrap payoffs which, under the null of no predictability, should have similar
expected returns. A second reason why the risk structure of such an arb trade matters is that
its payoff is hard to annualize. Note indeed that, in perfect markets without predictability,
this risk would be identical whether we place the orders one day beforehand, or one week, or
one month. Therefore, even though we trade every working day, the returns are not really
one-day returns in the usual sense: under the null, the expected payoff and risk of one arb
order with daily trading is the same as with weekly or monthly trading. In short, the usual rule
of annualization (×250 for means and variances) does not really apply here.20 So we abandon
the usual Sharpe ratio as our measure of success. Instead, we again resort to the bootstrap.
In this bootstrap, we test whether the payoff from these strategies is significantly different
from the results obtained by a large control group of hypothetical traders who, every day, place
exactly the same number of orders (nt) as we do, except that they pick the stocks randomly.
Therefore, we design our bootstrap procedure as follows. On each day, we randomly select nt
stocks from the total list of 72 and build equally weighted portfolios of size 10m or 10m
√
nt.
We repeat this step 1000 times to have payoffs from a control group of 1000 random traders
for each settlement date. We lastly check, for each and every settlement period, whether or
not the payoff from our trading strategy is outside the period’s 5%-95% percentile payoffs,
P0.05 and P0.95, obtained by the control group. If it is above the 95% bound, we say that our
strategy’s payoff for that date was significantly higher than that of the random trades. We do
this comparison not only for before-cost payoffs but also for after-cost payoffs.
20One could argue that the information-related risk bears on 3.5 hours, but how this is to be annualized is
not easy to say, as it depends on morning v afternoon v overnight v weekend risk, etc. And even if we knew how
many ‘morning-equivalents’ there are in a year, informationwise, the annual microstructural noise would still
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Table 9: Mean and Median of the Returns (percentage)
+ 2-3 + 3-4 >+4 – 2-3 – 3-4 <–4
number of events 4099 1485 1309 1685 593 500
number of trades 3709 1294 1058 1554 545 480
Payoff of strategies with the daily portfolio size of BEF 10 million; %/quinzaine
gross net gross net gross net gross net gross net gross net
mean 1.08 -1.41 1.43 -0.65 1.73 -0.32 0.44 -1.73 0.61 -1.36 0.72 -1.28
median 1.13 -1.42 1.47 -0.66 1.66 -0.39 0.46 -1.79 0.68 -1.35 0.78 -1.15
Strategies with the daily portfolio size of BEF 10 million×√nt
mean 1.08 -0.61 1.97 0.17 1.94 0.07 0.43 -1.34 0.45 -1.48 0.36 -1.55
median 1.13 -0.56 1.84 0.03 1.73 -0.13 0.45 -1.34 0.34 -1.81 0.28 -1.73
Key: This table reports the mean and median of the returns and the after-cost returns of the zero-investment
trading strategies, each of which is based on one of the six events, accumulated at every settlement date. pos 2,
pos 3, and pos 4 are for the positive event of 2%, 3%, and 4% respectively; neg 2, neg 3, and neg 4 for the
negative event of 2%, 3%, and 4% respectively. In these trades, the daily portfolio size is either BEF 10 million
or BEF 10 million multiplied by the square root of nt, which is the number of stocks selected for trading
For the hasty reader, Table 9 and Figure 8 provide the key information on the magnitude
of the payoffs relative to the notional investment. The tables show mean and median returns,
in percent per quinzaine, before and after costs. These after-cost typical payoffs are negative
in 10 (11) cases out of 12, if one considers just the means (medians). The exceptions occur
for the variable-size portfolio, if one reacts only to larger positive signals (> 3%); and even
these gains are trivial (the means are 0.17 and 0.07% per quinzaine of trading; the medians
are even worse). These mean and median numbers provide no information on risk, but the
visual material does give a first insight. In each of the graphs, the upper time-series plot shows
before-cost payoffs, the lower one the net results after costs. There is one such graph for each
of the six trading rules, so we have a set of six pictures for the fixed-budget trader (BEF
10m) and another for the variable-budget one. We see that even for the two rules that looked
marginally promising in terms of means there is substantial risk. Notably, even in the second
and third graph of Figure 8, the lower plot dips below the zero line about one quinzaine out of
two, and occasionally quite spectacularly so. In short, the picture is not hardly one of nearly
be horizon-independent. That is, we would need to know each of the three components of the 10 a.m.-to-1:30
p.m. variance.
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Figure 8: Returns on the zero-investment trades (percentage)
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Key: These graphs report the returns and after-cost returns of the zero-investment trading strategies, each of
which bases on one of the six events, accumulated at every settlement date. In these trades, the daily trading
limit for one leg is BEF 10m (top six graphs) or, for the lower six graphs, BEF 10m ×√nt, where nt is the
number of stocks selected for trading. The vertical axis shows the percentage returns, and the horizontal axis
is for the 181 settlement dates.
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risk-free arbitrage. We now take a closer look at these results, including the numbers for the
subgroups of stocks per turnover class and the results for the control group, the bootstrap.
Tables 10 and 11 report summary statistics for the payoffs of the six strategies and the
bootstrap. We start discussion with the gross (i.e. pre-cost) numbers for the +2% rule in
Table 10. The accumulated payoffs at each of the settlement dates are overwhelmingly often
positive (in 179/181 periods)—but so are the majority of the outcomes in the control group,
the bootstrap experiment: in 100 quinzaines, even the 5% unluckiest Monte-Carlo trader still
manages to stay out of the red zone. If, instead, we focus on how often the trading rule does
significantly better than our dice-tossing control groups, we see clearly unusal profits in a less
impressive 31 quinzaines, ie one out of six. The higher the initial forward premium we require
before we trade, the more pronounced the gains, both algebraically (Table 9) and statistically
(Table 10): the number of outcomes exceeding the period’s P0.95 value rises from 31 to 37
and even 71 out of about 180 periods if we increase the hurdle to +3 or +4%. The impact of
volume on significance seems to be fuzzy: high-volume stocks are clearly profitable more often
than low-turnover stocks if one looks at the +2% rule, but that pattern seems to be obscured
by the lower degree of diversication resulting from fewer trading signals when the hurdle is set
at 3 or 4%.
The results from the negative-event-related strategies are somewhat more mixed. First,
roughly one quinzaine out of three ends in the red even before costs. This could be due to the
systematic short positions between 10 a.m. and 1:30 p.m. we already know that selling forward
at 9 a.m. and closing out at 1:30 p.m. (the long version of what we do now) was quite profitable.
A second result is that the number of conspicuously good periods relative to the control group
(i.e. with outcomes > P0.95) is much smaller than what we see for positive premiums: 19
(versus 31) for –2% (v +2%), 34 v 37 for ±3%, and even 39 v 71 for ±4%. Simultaneously,
the number of unusually bad results becomes quite large: in the 72-stock applications, for
instance, there are already more signal failures than signal successes in the –2% case, and the
number of significantly bad outcomes stays at 15% for the –3 and –4% rules. This is, of course,
not due to shorting: in the control group, the hypothetical traders are short too. Rather, our
trading rule is betting on continuation, so losses stem from unexpected reversals; and since
we observe losses anomalously often, we can infer there were an anomalously large number of
such reversals. Thus, the results tell us that, given an initial negative premium, the process
is more like a ‘switch’ AR(1) than a regular one: often, negative premiums still tend to be
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Table 10: Bootstrap Significance Test of the Payoff: fixed trading limit
payoff P0.05 P0.95 payoff payoff < P0.05 payoff > P0.95
>0 <0 >0 <0 < P0.05 > P0.95 and >0 and <0 and >0 and <0
Trading strategy corresponds to the positive event of 2-3%
All 179 2 100 0 9 31 9 0 31 0
Low 176 4 81 0 6 34 6 0 34 0
Medium 160 19 30 0 4 29 2 2 29 0
High 137 32 24 0 9 39 1 8 39 0
All, after cost 0 181 0 154 9 31 0 9 0 31
Trading strategy corresponds to the positive event of 3-4%
All 167 10 41 0 2 37 1 1 37 0
Low 160 12 30 0 1 30 0 1 30 0
Medium 124 20 5 0 1 25 0 1 25 0
High 89 22 7 0 4 13 0 4 13 0
All, after cost 36 141 0 96 2 37 0 2 18 19
Trading strategy corresponds to the positive event of > 4%
All 151 19 24 0 8 71 0 8 71 0
Low 133 15 18 0 1 62 0 1 62 0
Medium 98 28 3 0 7 25 0 7 25 0
High 48 16 1 2 3 9 0 3 9 0
All, after cost 64 106 0 103 8 71 0 8 51 20
Trading strategy corresponds to the negative event of –2-3%
All 127 51 13 0 22 19 0 22 19 0
Low 95 67 4 0 37 14 0 37 14 0
Medium 118 41 3 1 14 38 0 14 38 0
High 93 57 3 0 26 35 1 25 35 0
All, after cost 4 174 0 145 22 19 0 22 4 15
Trading strategy corresponds to the negative event of –3-4%
All 113 48 1 0 24 34 0 24 34 0
Low 69 37 2 0 21 14 0 21 14 0
Medium 95 34 1 0 16 33 0 16 33 0
High 34 27 2 0 11 14 0 11 14 0
All, after cost 25 136 0 82 24 34 0 24 20 14
Trading strategy corresponds to the negative event of < −4%
All 97 38 2 0 21 39 0 21 39 0
Low 59 22 1 0 16 16 0 16 16 0
Medium 71 28 2 0 15 32 0 15 32 0
High 21 20 0 0 9 8 0 9 8 0
All, after cost 29 107 0 81 21 39 0 21 27 12
Key: We buy spot and sell forward after observing a forward premium that is positive and has the right size (see
subheaders), and we buy forward and sell spot when the forward premium was negative and has the right size. Each daily
portfolio is equally weighted and its overall notional size is BEF 10m; thus, if two arb trades are done on day t, each is a
spot-forward swap for a 5m notional. This table reports the number of quinzaines, out of at most 181, (i-ii) that had a
positive cq negative payoff; (iii) for which the 5%-percentile payoff P0.05 was positive; (iv) for which the 95%-percentile
P0.95 was negative; (v-vi) the actual payoff was significant (below P0.05 cq above P0.95); (vii-viii) the payoff was unusually
low and positive cq negative; and (ix-x) the actual payoff was unusually high and positive cq negative.
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Table 11: Bootstrap Significance Test of the Payoff: nt-dependent trading limit
payoff P0.05 P0.95 payoff payoff < P0.05 payoff > P0.95
>0 <0 >0 <0 < P0.05 > P0.95 and >0 and <0 and >0 and <0
Trading strategy corresponds to the positive event of 2-3%
All 180 1 108 0 7 39 7 0 39 0
Low 177 3 85 0 4 35 4 0 35 0
Medium 157 22 33 0 3 30 1 2 30 0
High 139 30 27 0 8 40 2 6 40 0
All, after cost 10 171 2 112 7 39 1 6 3 36
Trading strategy corresponds to the positive event of 3-4%
All 171 6 44 0 1 81 1 0 81 0
Low 139 10 28 0 4 19 4 0 19 0
Medium 74 23 4 0 1 14 0 1 14 0
High 64 11 6 0 3 13 0 3 13 0
All, after cost 90 87 2 76 1 81 0 1 68 13
Trading strategy corresponds to the positive event of > 4%
All 155 10 24 0 1 75 0 1 75 0
Low 113 9 20 0 1 18 1 0 18 0
Medium 58 20 3 0 2 12 0 2 12 0
High 39 9 1 2 1 11 0 1 10 1
All, after cost 76 94 0 87 1 75 0 1 64 11
Trading strategy corresponds to the negative event of –2-3%
All 133 45 12 0 23 20 1 22 20 0
Low 95 67 6 0 37 12 1 36 12 0
Medium 118 41 3 1 15 40 0 15 40 0
High 93 57 3 1 29 36 2 27 36 0
All, after cost 4 174 0 133 23 20 0 23 3 17
Trading strategy corresponds to the negative event of –3-4%
All 79 48 1 0 17 19 0 17 19 0
Low 28 12 0 0 6 2 0 6 2 0
Medium 32 16 1 0 5 4 0 5 4 0
High 22 8 1 0 4 10 0 4 10 0
All, after cost 14 147 0 75 17 19 0 17 12 7
Trading strategy corresponds to the negative event of < −4%
All 68 40 1 0 9 14 0 9 14 0
Low 17 18 1 0 7 0 0 7 0 0
Medium 29 14 1 0 4 8 0 4 8 0
High 7 8 0 0 2 3 0 2 3 0
All, after cost 11 125 0 74 10 14 0 10 8 6
Key: We buy spot and sell forward after observing a forward premium that is positive and has the right size (see
subheaders), and we buy forward and sell spot when the forward premium was negative and has the right size. Each
daily portfolio is equally weighted and its overall notional size is BEF 10m
√
n. Therefore, if two arb trades are done on
day t, each is a spot-forward swap for a 7.07m notional. This table reports the number of quinzaines, out of at most
181, (i-ii) that had a positive cq negative payoff; (iii) for which the 5%-percentile payoff P0.05 was positive; (iv) for which
the 95%-percentile P0.95 was negative; (v-vi) the actual payoff was significant (below P0.05 cq above P0.95); (vii-viii)
the payoff was unusually low and positive cq negative; and (ix-x) the actual payoff was unusually high and positive cq
negative.
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followed by negative premiums (hence the many significantly positive profits from betting on
continuation), but there also is a sizeable chance that negative premiums will switch straight
to positive ones (hence the many significantly negative outcomes). We will return to a possible
economic interpretation in the next subsection.
When taking into account the trading cost, the after-cost payoffs become negative in most
of the periods, as already noted w.r.t. the means. This holds for both positive and especially
negative signals. The stronger positive signals (+3, +4%) are unprofitable less often, again in
line with what we saw from the mean returns. Stronger negative signals are rarer, so more
often there is no trading at all; but even after taking this into account, we see that negative
outcomes are less rare too. Still, they remain by far the more likely outcome.
All of the above was for the fixed-size portfolio, set at BEF 10m. With the variable trading
limit 10m
√
nt we have a statistically better behaved time series of payoffs. This provides
higher power in the sense of more significant results. For the positive signals, the improvement
is marginal for the +2%/all-stock sample, but it strengthens with higher required signals and
smaller samples. For example, for a +4% signal and all stocks, 75 payoffs get an ‘excellent’
rating relative to the control group, compared to just 71 with the fixed-limit portfolio; in
an extreme example, in the +3% rule we do unambiguously well 81 times, against just 37
times with the fixed-limit portfolio. Consistently with the lower variance, also the results after
transaction costs are negative less often. If one confines oneself to the bigger +-signals, we see
what we already knew from the time series plots: the odds of winning become less uneven.
Still, we never get better than a 50/50 gamble, after cost. Also for negative signals there is also
more significance, but often in the wrong direction. In line with the switch-like patterns we
already noted after negative signals, a more orderly statistical now means that the unexpected
reversals become more visible; for the –2% signals, significantly good and bad outcomes are
roughly in balance, and for the –3 and –4% cases the significantly bad outcomes dominate the
good ones.
We conclude, first, that the ‘arbitrage’ transactions suggested by continuation of price dis-
crepancies are never low-risk in nature, and usually even produce a negative modal result. That
is, there seems to be no money conspicuously left in the table. This conclusion is conservative
for two reasons. First, the above tests have assumed away one additional risk that real-world
traders surely face: having traded at 10 a.m. in the hope of closing out at 1:30 p.m., they might
find that the spot market is too far out of equilibrium, meaning that planned noon trades must
be postponed for at least one day. This risk was assumed away by looking only at days where
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both markets trade, ex-post. On other low-liquidity days, the spot-market holder may have
to reduce the buy- or the sell-orders, which means that closing out partially happens later in
the day (in the Corbeille tier) or even the next day (in the parket market). The additional
uncertainty surely lowers expected returns (as the price discrepancy should have faded away
even more, one or two days later) and adds risk. The second reason why the results are too
optimistic is that we have ignored a second potential cost that is price pressure. We assume
that our trades, which could occasionally be as large as BEF 10m (i.e. approximate 250,000
Euros) for one stock, can always be executed at the day’s price, without having to ‘climb’ or
‘descend’ further into the limit-order book. For low-volume stocks, the average turnover in
the spot market per day is, in fact, BEF 717841.7, compared to which a single order of BEF
10m is non-trivial. In that light, our current conclusion that there are no low-risk arbitrage
opportunities is conservative.
A second finding is that there is an asymmetry: negative premiums are rarer at all levels,
and they unexpectedly often get reversed. A possible explanation is advanced in the next
section.
3.3 A Tentative Interpretation of the Sign-related Asymmetry
In this subsection, we provide a tentative interpretation of why we have autocorrelation and
why the pattern is asymmetric. Our avenue is that there might be other sources of friction or
costs than just pure time value, like issues in going short or in funding long positions.
Problems in shorting in the spot market could provide one possible explanation of why
price discrepancies persist. If shorting is difficult or impossible, then, spot prices would be
slower to react to bad news than forward prices, where shorting is very easy. Thus, upon
bad news, the ratio of forward over spot prices would be temporarily depressed, meaning that
negative p′s would tend to persist for some time. Positive p′s, in contrast, should disappear
overnight as buying spot is, in that narrative, no more difficult than buying forward.
We might also consider the opposite friction: maybe shorting stocks is not so often the
problem, but finding cash is. If many agents are fully invested and few of them have arranged
credit lines, then, upon good news, many agents would prefer to buy forward rather than spot,
thus creating positive forward premiums that could persist if prices do not fully adjust within
a day. Negative premiums, in contrast, would arise just by accident and tend to disappear
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fast.21
What the trading rule test results tell us is that the second pattern seems to be dominant,
and the first one is only weakly active at best. From Table 9 we know that positive events,
with excessively high forward prices, are about 2.5 to 3 times as likely as negative ones. Next,
the trading rules tell us that positive events are most persistent. Negative ones are less so, and
anomalously often a discount even gets reverted into a positive one the very next day. The
phenomenon of conditional autocorrelation is most pronounced with the less active stocks.
All this is exactly the opposite of what one would expect when shorting is systematically
difficult. Clearly, then, a desire to economize on cash, if anything, seems to be at the root
of the persistent discrepancies. In a setting where, sufficiently often, the marginal agents are
cash-strapped, buyers would prefer the forward market while sellers would go for a spot sale.
This would then imply patterns of persistently high forward prices relative to spot values. It
would also explain why these occurrences are so much more frequent than instances of very
low prices, even to the extent that also negative premiums are followed by positive ones more
often than one would expect on a random basis.
4 Conclusions
In perfect, quote-driven markets, a spot and a forward price should differ (only) because of time-
to-settlement differences and each return series itself should also contain its own time-value
effects. In a market where prices are set via a call rather than quoted by market makers, price
differences are also bound to arise because of unexpected imbalances in supply and demand,
but any such discrepancies should still be random over time. Empirically, however, both spot
and forward tiers of the BSE fail to always reflect the correct time value effect: in the spot tier,
the time value effect is insignificant, while in the forward tier the weak traces of time value are
limited to low-volume stocks. The settlement effect is very significant in the forward premiums,
but even there the estimates remain below our theoretical priors. Nor does the prediction of
random deviations hold: unconditionally there is a good dose of positive autocorrelation, but
mostly following positive premiums. A trading experiment suggests that predictability is too
weak to offer a low-risk positive return, but within those no-arbitrage bounds another factor
21The possible impact of ‘funding liquidity’ issues on prices has been discussed also in the U.S, literature; see
eg Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2005),
Coughenour and Saad (2004), Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, Jones, Moulton and Seasholes (2008), Grossman
and Vila (1992), and Liu and Longstaff (2004).
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seems to be at work. In fact, the pattern suggests that costly shorting of stocks in the spot
market is not so much an issue. Rather, problems with quickly raising liquidities could behind
most of the autocorrelation. What we see is consistent with a cash scarcity problem, steering
buyers to the levered forward market and sellers to the spot tier, rather than with problems
in shorting stocks in the cash market.
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Appendix I: Evaluating the Potential Bias in the Time-Value
Tests
One possible objection against the standard regression test for time value effects is that true
returns should be higher, on average, in periods with high risk-free rates, which would then
introduce some correlation between noise and the regressor and hence bias the coefficient
upward.
However, due to low variation of the risk-free rate, the bias is negligible, as proven below.
In the regression of forward rate rf,t on the time value ∆nf,tRt, where ∆nf,t = (nf,t−nf,t−1), is
rf,t = α+ β ∗∆nf,tRt + ρt + ef,t − ef,t−1. (19)
with (ρt + ef,t − ef,t−1) being the residual. The bias is introduced by the correlation between
the true return ρt and the risk-free rate Rt:
bias = β̂ − β = cov(rf,t,∆nf,tRt)
var(∆nf,tRt)
− β
=
cov(ρt,∆nf,tRt)
var(∆nf,tRt)
=
E(∆nf,t)
var(∆nf,tRt)
∗ corr(ρt, Rt)
√
var(ρt)var(Rt) (20)
In the extreme case, i.e. corr(ρt, Rt) = 1, the highest magnitude of bias is
E(∆nf,t)
var(∆nf,tRt) ∗√
var(ρt)var(Rt). We can roughly calculate the following numbers from the data:
E(∆nf,t) : -9.640E-04
var(∆nf,tRt) : 1.E-06
sqrtvar(Rt) : 6.79E-05
So the maximum bias is −0.65456 ∗√var(ρt), with ρt being not higher than the observed
prices, i.e. spot prices. Taking Delhaize stock in the studied period as an example, the
standard deviation of the spot prices was 0.012, which makes the maximum bias −0.000785472.
This negligible bias makes the interpretation of the OLS estimates in the single-market series
plausible.
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Table 12: Overview of Codes for Various Kinds of Prices
Missing Codes for Spot Price
AR buyers reduced
VR sellers reduced
AA, AC big buyers reduced‡
AC, VC big sellers reduced‡
CA modified buyers price (no transaction)
CP modified sellers price (no transaction)
CI indicative price (no transaction)
NC not quoted (no transaction)
HB the total turnover contains prolongated (rolled-over) trades turnover†
Missing Codes for Spot Price
* settlement price at 2 p.m. (on prolongation days) †
H, H the total turnover contains reported trades turnover
N, NC not quoted
Key:
†: Prolongations (deport, report) are roll-overs at the end of the quinzaine, arranged centrally on the day of the
prolongations. See footnote, section 1.3.
‡: One or a few orders were unusually large, and only those were reduced. In the normal case, all orders share
the reduction.
Appendix II: Further Data Description
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